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C
ardiovascular quality measures for inpatient care have
undergone a rapid evolution over the past three decades.
Isolated efforts at simply measuring quality have developed
into national programs dedicated toward the public reporting
of hospital performance on a number of quality measures.
Most recently, performance on quality measures has become
closely tied to hospital and physician payments. With the
implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), further
changes in how we measure, report, and pay for quality health
care will continue in coming years.
At their core, quality measures in cardiovascular care are
meanttoimprovethequalityofcaredeliveredtopatients,andin
doing so, improve patient-relevant outcomessuch as mortality,
hospital readmission, and patient experience. However, the
relationship between quality measures and hard outcomes has
been inconsistent, and thus, problematic for policymakers and
clinical leaders who aim to use these measures to effectively
drive improvements in cardiovascular care. In this review, we
examine the evidence behind three major mechanisms of
qualityimprovement:measurementalone,publicreporting,and
pay-for-performance. In characterizing the successes and
failures that have occurred as part of each of these mecha-




History of Quality Measurement
The earliest steps toward quality improvement involved simply
creating and implementing basic mechanisms for quality
measurement. In the 1950s, the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (formerly JCAHO,
now The Joint Commission, TJC) began mandating hospital
compliance with a set of “Minimum Standards” of quality
(Figure), which were later incorporated into the process of
hospital accreditation under the ORYX Initiative of the
1990s.
1,2 As part of ORYX, accredited hospitals were required
to regularly provide TJC with a subset of performance data to
identify areas in need of improvement.
Cardiovascularcarewasamongtheﬁrstareasinmedicinein
which standardized quality measurement was attempted on a
national scale. In 1992, the Health Care Financing Administra-
tion (HCFA, now the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, CMS), began measuring and tracking a series of
disease-speciﬁc process-of-care measures for Medicare
patientsundertheHealthCare Quality ImprovementInitiative.
3
The chosen measures were based on evidence-based guide-
lines at the time for prevention and treatment of multiple
conditions, including acute myocardial infarction (AMI), heart
failure,andstroke.InconcertwithearlyTJCefforts,theprogram
intended to provide hospitals with performance data and
nonpunitively highlight areas for improvement.
The Cooperative Cardiovascular Project (CCP) was a
program under the Health Care Quality Improvement Initiative
that deﬁned and measured adherence to evidence-based
practices for AMI care,
4,5 such as the use of thrombolytics or
aspirin during hospitalization, and the receipt of beta-blockers
and angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors at dis-
charge. Initial data from this program demonstrated wide-
spread deﬁciencies in care: among “ideal candidates,” 69% of
patients received thrombolytics and 83% received aspirin
during hospitalization; at discharge, only 45% of patients
received beta-blockers.
4 CMS later launched the National
Heart Failure (NHF) project in 1999,
6 which aimed to deﬁne
and measure adherence to standards for high quality care for
heart failure, such as measurement of left ventricular (LV)
systolic function, and the use of ACE inhibitors in patients
with LV systolic dysfunction. This program similarly found
suboptimal and variable performance across hospitals: the
range of appropriate evaluation of LV systolic function
spanned from 21% to 66%, while adherence to ACE inhibitor
therapy for eligible patients spanned from 51% to 93%.
7
In concert with these federal efforts, the 1980s and 1990s
saw the growth of national registries to track, measure, and
From the Department of Health Policy and Management, Harvard School of
Public Health, Boston, MA (P.C., K.E.J.); Cardiovascular Division, Brigham &
Women’s Hospital, Boston, MA (K.E.J.); Harvard Medical School (P.C., K.E.J.),
and Cardiology Service, VA Boston Healthcare System (K.E.J.), Boston, MA.
Correspondence to: Karen E. Joynt, MD, MPH, 75 Francis St., Boston, MA
02115. E-mail: kjoynt@partners.org
J Am Heart Assoc. 2014;3:e000404 doi: 10.1161/JAHA.113.000404.
ª 2014 The Authors. Published on behalf of the American Heart Association,
Inc., by Wiley Blackwell. This is an open access article under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.
DOI: 10.1161/JAHA.113.000404 Journal of the American Heart Association 1
CONTEMPORARY REVIEWimprove quality in cardiovascular care. The Society for
Thoracic Surgeons (STS) introduced the STS National Data-
base to track risk-adjusted outcomes in adult cardiac and
general thoracic surgery for both internal quality improvement
and public reporting purposes, while the National Registry of
Myocardial Infarction began to track and measure practice
patterns and outcomes for AMI patients. In 1997, the
American College of Cardiology developed the National
Cardiovascular Data Registry to consolidate clinical data in
cardiovascular care. Early registry-based studies conﬁrmed
the widespread underuse of thrombolytic therapy, aspirin, and
beta-blockers, particularly in elderly patients and patients with
delayed AMI presentations.
8 Perhaps more importantly, the
registries were the ﬁrst large-scale efforts to track patient
outcomes in addition to process measures, indicating a
marked change from the CMS and TJC programs.
Borne out of a public-private nonproﬁt partnership, the
National Quality Forum (NQF) was formed in 1999 to set
national standards of healthcare quality. Speciﬁcally, the NQF
deﬁned quality metrics, organized data collection, and
reported standards in accordance with recommendations
from the President’s Advisory Council.
9 Importantly, the NQF
improved public access to quality data while playing a key role
in introducing new quality metrics for adoption by CMS, with
an eventual emphasis on outcome measures.
Efforts at quality measurement were further bolstered by
the public release of the Institute of Medicine’s landmark
study, Crossing the Quality Chasm, in 2001.
10 In response to
the pervasive quality gaps described therein, TJC introduced
identical quality measures as CMS beginning in 2002 and
required over 3000 of its accredited hospitals to submit
performance data on at least 2 of 4 condition-speciﬁc
measures: AMI, heart failure, pneumonia, and pregnancy-
related conditions.
11 In addition to standardizing quality
measurement, TJC provided hospitals with quarterly perfor-
mance reports to motivate improvement. Studies of this
quality measurement scheme after 2 years of its implemen-
tation showed a 3% to 33% improvement from baseline in the
proportion of patients receiving appropriate care for AMI,
heart failure, and pneumonia,
11 with the lowest-performing
hospitals at baseline showing the greatest improvement.
By the early 2000s, quality measurement in cardiovascular
care involved a multilevel framework, with both public and
private contributions atthestate and national levels. A growing
bodyofevidenceconﬁrmedwidespreadvariabilityinadherence
to guideline-based process measures, suggesting that simply
deﬁning quality metrics did not necessarily translate into
adoption by clinicians. Nevertheless, such frameworks set the
stage for understanding whether adherence to process-based
care led to improved patient outcomes.
Relationship Between Quality Measurement and
Patient Outcomes
Early data on the relationship between measurement and
outcomes in cardiovascular care showed inconsistent correla-
tions. One of the ﬁrst studies to address this, a small, patient-
level observational study of stroke care in 3 New Zealand
hospitals, showed signiﬁcant differences in process-of-care
scores (as assessed by obtaining a head CT, performing a
swallow study prior to feeding, and completing a multidisci-
plinary care meeting) between non-survivors and survivors at
the time of hospital discharge. Yet, paradoxically, of the 3
hospitals studied, the hospital with the poorest process score
Figure. Timeline of quality improvement programs in cardiovascular care. Green: quality measurement
programs; red: public reporting; purple: pay-for-performance programs. BCBSM indicates Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Michigan Participating Hospital Agreement Incentive Program; CABG, coronary artery bypass
graft; HQID, hospital quality incentives demonstration; HQSR, Hawaii Medical Service Association Hospital
Quality Service and Recognition Pay-for-Performance Program; JCAHO, Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Healthcare Organizations; OPTIMIZE-HF, Organized Program to Initiate Lifesaving Treatment in
Hospitalized Patients With Heart Failure.
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Wdemonstrated the best-case, mix-adjusted outcomes of death
and functional status at the time of discharge.
12
The process-outcome relationship for AMI care has also
been shown to be signiﬁcant, though variable in magnitude. A
study from the Can Rapid Risk Stratiﬁcation of Unstable
Angina Patients Suppress Adverse Outcomes With Early
Implementation of the American College of Cardiology
(ACC)/American Heart Association (AHA) Guidelines (CRU-
SADE) trial demonstrated a strong correlation between
processes of care and outcomes, with every 10% increase in
composite adherence to process measures associated with a
10% decrease in in-hospital mortality.
13 However, a larger
hospital-level study of AMI care for Medicare patients showed
that while receipt of beta-blockers and aspirin at time of
discharge was associated with lower risk-standardized 30-day
mortality rates, when taken together, performance on process
measures explained only 6% of hospital-level variation in risk-
standardized, 30-day mortality rates.
14
The process-outcome relationship for heart failure has also
been shown to be modest. In the Organized Program to
Initiate Lifesaving Treatment in Hospitalized Patients With
Heart Failure (OPTIMIZE-HF), a patient-level registry designed
to promote guideline-based care for heart failure patients,
none of the process-of-care measures were found to be
associated with lower mortality at 60 or 90 days, and only
ACE-inhibitor or angiotensin receptor blocker use at discharge
was associated with lower readmission and later post-
hospitalization mortality.
15 Ironically, though beta-blocker
use at discharge was not established as a process measure
for heart failure performance at the time, it was shown to be
strongly associated with reduced mortality rates. More recent
studies have conﬁrmed this weak overall process-outcome
relationship in heart failure care: analyses from the American
Heart Association’s Get With The Guidelines Program for heart
failure (GWTG-HF) demonstrated that more frequent mea-
surement of LV ejection fraction and use of ACE inhibitors or
angiotensin receptor blockers in patients with LV dysfunction
did not translate into lower 30-day mortality rates, but did
result in small, but signiﬁcant, reductions in 30-day readmis-
sion rates.
16
Limitations of Quality Measurement in Improving
Patient Outcomes
While process measures are intuitively valid as quality
metrics, their impact on outcomes remains limited. One
possible reason for this modest relationship is simply that
some process-of-care measures are not designed to impact
short-term mortality. For example, measuring ejection fraction
or counseling patients on smoking cessation, while good
care practice, are unlikely to have an immediate impact
on short-term mortality. Furthermore, as guideline-based
cardiovascular care has become codiﬁed, there is little
between-hospital variability in adherence to some process-
of-care measures, making it difﬁcult to detect associated
differences in mortality rates. Finally, risk-adjusted mortality
measurements may suffer from residual confounding by
clinical complexity or socioeconomic factors, thus limiting
the ability to determine the true relationship between
process-of-care and mortality. Nonetheless, in spite of their
weak relationship with outcomes, process measures continue
to be useful quality metrics due to their inherent face validity
as well as their independent utility in ensuring the delivery of
high-quality, guideline-based care.
Quality Improvement Through Public
Reporting
History of Public Reporting
As quality measurement took hold in American hospitals, the
public release of hospital performance on quality measures
emerged as the natural next step in incenting quality
improvement. The rationale behind public reporting was
twofold: ﬁrst, making performance data public could provide
a powerful incentive for clinicians and leaders to improve;
second, it would empower consumers to make choices based
on hospital and physician performance.
Public reporting was initiated at the state level prior to its
use as a national strategy. In 1989, New York (NY) State
began reporting risk-adjusted mortality rates for coronary
artery bypass grafting (CABG) surgery by hospital and
surgeon. Pennsylvania (PA) followed suit in 1992, reporting
CABG outcomes as well as costs of care; Massachusetts (MA)
initiated a public reporting program for CABG outcomes in
2002. These states have also initiated programs for public
reporting of percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI): New
York in 1991, Pennsylvania in 2001, and Massachusetts in
2005.
17
However, the ﬁrst large-scale, national endeavor to publicly
report hospital quality data began in the early 2000s, when
the Hospital Quality Alliance (HQA) was borne out of a
collaborative venture between CMS, TJC, and several medical
professional organizations. To support the HQA efforts,
Congress passed the Medicare Modernization Act of
2003,
18 which tied hospitals’ participation in public reporting
to annual payment updates, effectively incenting hospitals to
report data to CMS on 10 evidence-based process measures
for the management of AMI, heart failure, and pneumonia—
essentially the same set of metrics that had been collected by
TJC and HCFA in earlier years. The ﬁrst set of HQA data was
released in 2004, and for the ﬁrst time, the American public
could access quality data on nearly all U.S. hospitals on a
centralized website, Hospital Compare.
19
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WRelationship Between Public Reporting and
Patient Outcomes
The ﬁrst studies to examine public reporting’s impact on
outcomes were from the state-level CABG reporting programs.
Initial results suggested that public reporting in NY led to
decreases in CABG mortality over time, which was initially
attributed to de-selection of surgeons with high mortality rates
and improvements in processes of care in response to
reporting.
20–22However,subsequentworkshowedcomparable
decreases in states without public reporting,
23,24 suggesting
that these improvements might have been the result of secular
trends rather than public reporting, per se. Studies of the PCI
public reporting programs have found no overall difference in
mortality rates for reporting versus nonreporting states.
17
In contrast, the ﬁrst evaluations of the Hospital Compare
national public reporting program were positive: though
baseline performance on these metrics was variable,
25
studies showed that overall performance on process mea-
sures improved signiﬁcantly over the ﬁrst 2 years of public
reporting.
11 Perhaps even more impressive was the ﬁnding
that higher performance on these process measures was
associated with lower risk-adjusted mortality rates for AMI,
heart failure and pneumonia, though the differences were,
again, small.
26,27 A follow-up study examining the ﬁrst 3 years
of the program also showed that improvement in performance
over time was associated with improved outcomes for AMI: a
10-point increase in performance on process measures was
associated with an 0.6% reduction in 30-day mortality rates
and an 0.5% reduction in 30-day readmission rates.
28 There
were minimal effects for heart failure and pneumonia,
however. Nonetheless, this study raised the possibility that
public reporting of the same metrics that had been simply
measured for many years might be a key innovation in
incenting meaningful improvements in patient outcomes.
However, more recent studies of Hospital Compare have
painted a less rosy picture, suggesting that the improvements
in mortality might be more the result of underlying hospital
quality than about the publicly reported measures themselves.
For example, a recent study showed that of the 180 hospitals
in the top quintile of mortality rates for AMI, fewer than one-
third (31%) were in the top quintile of the composite process
score, and that together, the HQA process measures
explained only 6% of hospital-level variation in 30-day
mortality rates.
14 Perhaps most striking is the recent ﬁnding
that while mortality rates for AMI, HF, and pneumonia
improved in the period after the introduction of Hospital
Compare, the improvement essentially followed the trends in
mortality prior to the program, suggesting that the addition of
public reporting did not lead to a more rapid improvement in
mortality rates than was occurring under quality measurement
alone.
29
Limitations of Public Reporting in Improving
Patient Outcomes
The major limitation of public reporting is the concern that it
may lead physicians to avoid high-risk patients in order to
avoid poor outcomes. Studies examining this in the context of
CABG surgery have been equivocal: while one study found an
increase in the number of patients transferred to the
Cleveland Clinic from NY State after the initiation of CABG
reporting,
30 another demonstrated that the risk proﬁle of
patients receiving CABG in NY State actually worsened after
the adoption of public reporting, and NY State residents who
received CABG surgery in-state were of higher-risk than those
who received surgery out-of-state.
22 Whether this was due in
part to greater attention to coding of medical comorbidities as
a response to public reporting is unclear.
Racial and ethnic minorities are another group that may be
perceived to be at higher risk of poor outcomes, and thus may
be at risk of decreased access to surgical care under public
reporting. Two studies have examined this issue using CABG
data from the NY experience, one of which found that
disparities between black and white patients in rates of CABG
increased in NY State after the adoption of public reporting
31;
the other demonstrated that non-whites in NY State were
more likely to be treated by surgeons with high mortality rates
after the adoption of reporting.
32
A study looking at differences in case mix and outcomes
for PCI in NY found a signiﬁcantly lower propensity to
undergo PCI in NY than in Michigan (a nonreporting state) for
AMI,
33 and an analysis of a registry of patients with
cardiogenic shock demonstrated that NY patients in shock
were less than half as likely as non-NY patients in shock to
undergo PCI.
34 Beyond the NY experience alone, a recent
national study demonstrated that the 3 states with manda-
tory public reporting of PCI outcomes (NY, PA, and MA) had
signiﬁcantly lower rates of use of this procedure for patients
with an AMI. This was associated with higher mortality for
patients with ST-elevation myocardial infarction, though
overall mortality rates in the AMI population were unaf-
fected.
17
Some of this reduction in use likely is due to reporting-
induced risk aversion among physicians; a survey of inter-
ventional cardiologists in NY State found that 89% of
respondents felt that reporting had inﬂuenced their decision
on whether to intervene in critically ill patients, although this
study did not include data on actual practices.
35 Another
study examining hospitals’ response to identiﬁcation as an
“outlier” for mortality rates after PCI in Massachusetts
showed that the risk proﬁle of PCI patients at outlier
institutions was signiﬁcantly lower after public identiﬁcation
as an outlier, suggesting that risk aversion increased among
PCI operators at outlier institutions as a result.
36
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WIn summary, the experience with public reporting demon-
strates little evidence that reporting is associated with
improvement on either process-of-care or patient outcomes
for cardiovascular disease, above and beyond quality measure-
ment alone, and demonstrates that avoidance of high-risk
patients is a real consequence of these programs. Thus, it
remains unclear whether the net effect of public reporting is
positiveornegative.Indeed,theabsenceofrandomizedtrialsof
public reporting and the existing observational data limits our
abilitytoconclusivelyassessitsneteffectonpatientoutcomes,
and the expectation of conclusive evidence may be unwar-
ranted at this stage. As such, future rigorous trials are required
inordertofullyexcludethepossiblesmall-to-moderatebeneﬁts
of public reporting. There are certainly many beneﬁts to public
reporting that may not be captured in process-of-care or
outcome measurement, such as increased transparency and
improved trust from patients and other consumers. In this
context, it is unlikely that public reporting will cease any time
soon. In fact, the Hospital Compare program has expanded to
include measures of patient satisfaction, surgical quality, and
nursinghomeratings,amongothers.
19However,whetherthese
beneﬁts will be worth the potential unintended consequences




Paying for performance (P4P) is the newest quality improve-
ment effort that has been used on a national scale for
cardiovascular care. Certainly, P4P has strong face validity in
that when the appropriate ﬁnancial incentives are in place,
there is likely to be a strong stimulus to improve on the part of
both clinicians and hospital administrators. Furthermore, as
cost control became a major concern for policymakers, P4P
gained traction as a strategy for maximizing quality while
prioritizing cost effectiveness.
As was the case in public reporting, state-level experiments
predatedfederalones.Large-scaleexamplesofP4Pincludethe
Hawaii Medical Service Association Hospital Quality Service
and Recognition P4P Program (HQSR),
37 and the Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM) Participating Hospital Agree-
ment Incentive Program,
38 both of which were launched in
2001. Similar to many prior quality programs, both programs
used process-of-care measures for AMI, heart failure, and
pneumonia in assessing quality. While both programs offered
bonus ﬁnancial incentives, neither included a ﬁnancial penalty
for poor performance. Only the Hawaii Medical Service
Association program included outcome measures as part of
their quality assessment. Both programs emphasized absolute
performance over improvements from baseline.
The ﬁrst nationwide foray into hospital-level P4P began in
2003 when 421 hospitals were invited by CMS to participate
in the Premier Hospital Quality Incentives Demonstration
(HQID), with 252 hospitals ultimately joining the program and
providing data for analysis.
39 HQID offered payment bonuses
to hospitals based on their performance on a set of disease-
speciﬁc process measures, which were very similar to
measures established by the HQA for AMI, CHF, and
pneumonia. Hospitals in the highest deciles of performance
qualiﬁed for a ﬁnancial bonus while those with the poorest
performance were susceptible to a ﬁnancial penalty.
Relationship Between Pay-for-Performance and
Patient Outcomes
Studies of the Hawaii P4P program found modest beneﬁt:
after 4 years of the HQSR, there were signiﬁcant decreases in
risk-adjusted complication rates and lengths-of-stay for
surgical and obstetric procedures, as well as improvements
in patient satisfaction with emergency department care as
measured by individual hospital surveys.
37 The BCBSM P4P
program was associated with improvements in processes of
care from 2000 to 2003, with more patients receiving aspirin
after AMI (87% to 95%), beta-blocker after AMI (81% to 93%),
and ACE inhibitors for heart failure (70% to 80%); but again,
outcomes were not assessed.
38
Studies of the HQID program showed greater improve-
ments in adherence to guideline-based process measures
over a 2-year period in Premier hospitals as compared with
hospitals without these incentives, though this study did
not evaluate patient outcomes.
40 However, another study
released in the same year, with a broader comparison group,
showed no signiﬁcant difference in a composite measure of
the 6 CMS-rewarded processes between HQID versus
non-HQID hospitals, and no evidence to suggest that
improvements in mortality were greater at HQID hospitals.
41
Even more problematic was a report examining performance
on process measures and patient outcomes at the 5-year
mark of the program, which demonstrated no difference
between HQID and non-HQID hospitals on any of the metrics
and no difference in mortality rates between the 2 groups.
42
Overall, the available evidence on large-scale hospital pay-
for-performance programs for cardiovascular disease sug-
gests that these programs have led to only very modest, if
any, improvement in either processes or outcomes of care
beyond that achieved with quality measurement or public
reporting. However, the success of pay-for-performance as a
quality-improvement mechanism most likely lies in the details,
such as the size of the incentive, baseline performance levels,
and a hospital’s inherent ability to improve and respond
adequately to such incentives.
43 It is feasible that alternative
designs to pay-for-performance programs, for example
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Wincluding larger incentives, targeting incentives at particularly
high-impact measures, and considering both group and
individual performance evaluation, may yield better results.
44
New National Quality Improvement Efforts
While many of the quality improvement and public reporting
efforts described above continue, there are a number of new
quality-improvement efforts for cardiovascular disease emerg-
ing at the national level, most notably Value-Based Purchasing
(VBP) and the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program
(HRRP).
Value-Based Purchasing
The VBP program is a national P4P program that represents
an attempt to fundamentally shift Medicare from a passive
payer of services into active purchaser of quality health care.
Based largely on the same quality metrics and payment
incentives as the Premier HQID, VBP starts with a 1%
“holdback” of Medicare payments, and hospitals can earn
bonuses ≤1% based on a complex formula rewarding perfor-
mance, improvement, and consistency on processes of care
and patient experience; mortality rates and efﬁciency metrics
will be phased in during future iterations of the program.
45
While the long-term beneﬁts of VBP in terms of improving
hospital quality remain to be seen, it is of concern that the
Premier HQID program on which VBP is based has led to little
improvement beyond secular trends. Moreover, the fairly small
amount of payment that will be at risk for hospitals
46 suggests
that there should be at least some degree of skepticism about
its likely impact on quality, and in turn, on patient outcomes.
Other concerns have been raised about whether the VBP
penalties will be too punitive for hospitals that disproportion-
ately care for poor patients. A recent simulation of the VBP
programsuggestedthatdespiteoverallimprovementnationally
on quality metrics, hospitals in disadvantaged areas would
continue to have lower performance levels in comparison to
hospitals in better-resourced areas, leading to signiﬁcantly
higher ﬁnancial penalties.
47 Other studies have shown that
safety-net hospitals are more likely to be penalized under VBP,
particularlyonmeasuresofpatientexperience.
48Nevertheless,
these prior studies have beenmodeling exercises,and can only
serve as predictive models of the future of VBP. It is possible
that the majority of hospitals will be able to respond construc-
tively to the ﬁnancial incentives created in the ACA.
The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program
The HRRP is a program that reduces Medicare payments to
hospitals with higher-than-expected readmission rates for
AMI, heart failure, and pneumonia.
49 The intent of the
program is to place increasing attention on good discharge
practices, encourage enhanced communication with outpa-
tient providers, and reduce fragmentation of care. Initial
reports from the year leading up to the implementation of the
HRRP suggest slight drops in readmission rates nationally,
50
which is an encouraging early signal for the potential success
of this program.
However, there are concerns about the HRRP as well. For
instance, while readmission rates have a high degree of face
validity, prior studies have shown that only approximately 27%
of readmissions are “preventable.”
51 Further, there is little
relationship between typical measures of hospital quality and
readmission rates.
52–54 Another potential concern with the
HRRP is the inverse relationship that has been demonstrated
between mortality and readmission rates for HF in particular,
though the mechanism underlying this relationship is poorly
understood.
55,56 Finally, readmissions may be inﬂuenced by
patient socioeconomic complexity, as well as by community
resources,
57,58 which are not adjusted for in the CMS penalty
scheme. Perhaps reﬂective of these issues, early research on
the impact of the HRRP demonstrates that large hospitals,
teaching hospitals, and safety-net hospitals are currently
receiving the highest penalties.
59 Whether or not this will have
a signiﬁcant negative downstream impact on these hospitals
is not yet known.
Methodological Issues in Cardiology Quality
Measures
Deﬁning Metrics
Although process measures remain minimally correlated with
outcomes and may represent clinical concepts that are
somewhat inaccessible to patients,
60 they do have indepen-
dent value as a marker of a hospital’s ability to provide
widely accepted, guideline-based clinical care. To this end,
the ACC/AHA Task Force on Performance Measures released
a report in 2005 outlining attributes of optimal performance
measures, including interpretability, actionability, clear
numerator and denominator calculation, and feasibility.
61
As the number and complexity of quality metrics proliferate,
adhering to these recommendations will be increasingly
important.
Using Appropriate Analytics to Test Quality
Measures’ Impact
The earliest studies on quality measurement programs were
limited by the absence of a comparison group and lack of
adjustment for secular trends toward improvement, thus
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Wcreating the illusion of success when in reality the improve-
ments seen were simply reﬂective of larger national trends in
care. This is particularly important for cardiovascular care,
where such trends have resulted in falling mortality rates for
AMI and minimal variability in process adherence across U.S.
hospitals. Future studies of quality metrics should include a
comparison group whenever possible, be sufﬁciently powered
in sample size to overcome the issues of variability and
adequately tease apart the low signal-to-noise relationship
between process and outcomes, and account for secular
trends.
Anotheranalyticissueisdeterminingtheappropriatelevelat
which to conduct studies of quality improvement. Analyses at
the patient level allow a more granular study, but are difﬁcult to
conduct due to issues of privacy and limitations in data
collection; hospital-level analyses allow for ease of measure-
ment but are constrained by the loss of speciﬁc information
at larger study units and the inability to fully control for
confounders. Indeed, some have argued that the absence of a
strong, consistent relationship between process and outcome
measures may be the result of ecological fallacy in falsely
generalizinghospital-levelanalysestothepatientlevel.
62Given
such tension, future studies should employ hierarchical
analyses when feasible to allow for the adequate examination
of patient, hospital, and health system factors in achieving
quality.
Finally, the methods used to assess outcomes themselves
are important to consider. In the absence of randomized
controlled trials, it is difﬁcult to ensure equal distribution of
confounders in comparison groups. Current models, which
often rely on administrative data, may have inadequate ability
to account for differences in patient population and case mix
that may impact hospital performance, and possibly augment




As the pressure to comply with quality measures mounts,
there is growing incentive for physicians and hospitals to
“game” the system to make their performance appear better.
There are a growing number of “exclusions” from quality
metrics
64 as well as data suggesting that hospitals may game
the system by reclassifying patients into or out of publicly
reported diagnoses.
65 Upcoding, in which hospitals code a
higher number of diagnoses to make patients appear “sicker”
and, therefore, risk-adjusted outcomes appear better, also
occurs.
66,67 One strategy to combat gaming may be the
move to broader outcome metrics, such as all-cause
mortality or all-cause readmission rates, though these
metrics have their own limitations and do not fully deal with
issues of upcoding.
Involvement of Industry in Quality Improvement
Finally, it is worth noting that several national efforts at quality
measurement, including OPTIMIZE, CRUSADE, and the
National Registry of Myocardial Infarction mentioned previ-
ously, as well as the Acute Decompensated Heart Failure
National Registry (ADHERE), were industry-sponsored efforts
at quality improvement. This is worth particular consideration
when quality improvement is measured by the uptake of
sponsored products. For example, OPTIMIZE and the Registry
to Improve the Use of Evidence-Based Heart Failure Therapies
in the Outpatient Setting (IMPROVE-HF) trials put in place
speciﬁc strategies to increase the use of beta-blockers and
implantable cardioverter deﬁbrillators produced by their
respective pharmaceutical sponsors, prior to the inclusion of
these strategies in formal ACC/AHA guidelines.
Multiple prior studies have shown industry-sponsored
studies to be more likely to publish results favorable to the
sponsor than non-industry-sponsored studies,
68 and that the
“industry bias” is, indeed, independent of an otherwise
expected “risk of bias.”
69 While the quality of trial methods
in industry-sponsored studies have been shown to be at least
as good as, if not better, than non-industry-sponsored
efforts,
68 recent studies have shown that knowledge of
industry sponsorship negatively inﬂuences physicians’ per-
ceptions of study quality and lowers the propensity to change
clinical behaviors based on trial ﬁndings, regardless of a
study’s true methodologic rigor.
70 Such implications may be
important when identifying strategies for promoting changes
in clinical behavior related to quality improvement.
Conclusions
Quality metrics for cardiovascular disease are here to stay,
though their utility in improving patient outcomes remains
unclear. Measuring quality does seem to improve quality for
processes of care, but unless these process measures are
closely linked to patient-relevant outcomes, such as mortality,
hospital readmission, or patient experience, they may not
have maximal impact. Public reporting of quality metrics thus
far has not been shown to have positive impacts on
outcomes, and though reporting may have value in improving
transparency and promoting patient trust in the health care
system, future programs should be designed with unintended
consequences of risk aversion in patient selection in mind.
Finally, pay-for-performance continues to have tremendous
face validity as a quality improvement approach, in spite of its
somewhat limited success on a national scale thus far. Future
attempts at pay-for-performance may beneﬁt from creating
incentives that are large enough to inﬂuence provider
behavior, measuring performance in a minimally complex
and clinically relevant manner, and focusing on high-impact
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Wmetrics like mortality. However, these too are likely subject to
unintended consequences in terms of patient selection.
Quality measurement in cardiovascular care remains an
active area for innovation and continued evaluation. More
than ever before, the study of the impact of quality
improvement efforts on patient outcomes will be crucial to
improve cardiovascular health in the coming years.
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